Dylan Mortin(아시아연구소 방문연구원)
북베트남은 왜 그리고 어떻게 중국식 ‘인민전쟁’ 전략에서 소련식 기계화 전쟁 교리로 전환했으며, 이 변화가 어떤 영향을 초래했는가?
Jim Pomeroy’s first book, an emanation of his master’s thesis, follows the inverse road. It will likely provide limited additional value to international relations scholars, who now need no convincing that states absorb the weapons and tactics of their stronger peers in order to maximize their odds of victory. Alliances & Armor: Communist Diplomacy and Armored Warfare during the War in Vietnam traces how North Vietnam’s military doctrine evolved under the shifting influences of its stronger communist patrons (China and the Soviet Union), arguing that the country’s eventual battlefield success cannot be dissociated from its diplomatic alignments. Drawing on both primary and secondary sources, Pomeroy shows how Hanoi transitioned from Maoist “People’s War” strategies in the 1950s to a Soviet-style mechanized doctrine by the mid-1960s, enabled by deliveries of tanks and armored vehicles that remade Vietnamese offensive doctrine. Hence, for Pomeroy, alliance politics directly shaped battlefield outcomes: Soviet material support and doctrinal guidance allowed the North Vietnamese Army to mount increasingly mechanized offensives, culminating in the Easter Offensive of 1972 and the final Ho Chi Minh Campaign of 1975.
Pomeroy’s argument that Vietnam was willing to emulate Soviet ways to win its wars more rapidly and at lesser costs resonates with Mearsheimer and thus is hardly new. The work, however, brings the level of international politics to bear on the understanding of little-studied North Vietnamese military reforms and battles, which gives a higher value to the endeavor than would have been a more classical narrative focused on Vietnam’s internal calculations. Admirably, Pomeroy mobilized primary sources from the two Vietnams, the Soviet Union, China, and the United States. The shift from a Chinese- compatible “People’s War’ doctrine during the 1950s to a more Soviet, mechanized one during the 1960s is well demonstrated. Growing deliveries of Soviet armor allowed such an evolution, which North Vietnam’s leadership hoped would unlock the inter-Vietnamese stalemate, demoralize the United States, and enable a quick and decisive defeat of the South. In that sense, this short book’s mission is accomplished.
