Melissa Rudderham describes some of the common foreign policy behaviours of middle-power states as “good ‘global citizenship,’ niche diplomacy, and accepting roles as mediators, followers, or staunch multilateralists.”⁷ Through these internationalist activities, middle powers help to maintain the LIO that benefits them.⁸

The middle power concept is a contested one. It puts countries like Canada, Australia, Turkey, South Korea, South Africa, and Indonesia in the same category. The mainstream literature on middle powers mainly focuses on established middle powers such as Australia and Canada and their roles and contributions to the LIO.⁹ Eduard Jordaan points out the lack of analytical clarity of the middle power concept, and outlines the following distinct constitutive and behavioural differences between traditional (or established) and emerging middle powers: (1) emerging middle powers are relatively unstable and recently democratized, while traditional middle powers are stable social democracies in terms of democratic tradition; (2) emerging middle powers gained their middle power status after the Cold War, while traditional democracies emerged during the Cold War; (3) emerging middle powers occupy a semi-peripheral status in the world economy, while traditional powers are core states; (4) the domestic distribution of wealth within emerging middle powers is highly unequal, while it is more equal in traditional middle powers; (5) emerging middle powers are highly influential in their respective regions compared to traditional middle powers; (6) neutrality is important for regional self-association among emerging middle powers, while neutrality is relatively unimportant for traditional middle powers.¹⁰ These constitutive dissimilarities lead to certain behavioural differences between traditional and emerging middle powers. Emerging middle powers pursue moderately high regional orientation, are eager to lead regional cooperation and integration, aspire to take regional leadership roles, and are reformist and favour non-radical change of the international system.¹¹ In contrast, traditional middle powers’ behaviour is characterized by low regional orientation, reluctance toward regional integration, and a tendency to accommodate calls for global reform through appeasement.¹² Jordaan lists three main problems that are likely to challenge emerging middle powers’ regional and/or global aspirations: low-quality and unequal development (semi-peripheral position in the world economy), democratization experience (relatively unstable democratic tradition or liberal democracy that is still in progress), and highly unequal domestic distribution of wealth.

In the post-Cold-War period under the unipolar international system, emerging middle powers adopted a coalition-building, institution-building, and consensus-oriented approach to tackling international issues.¹³ Turkey and South Korea fall under Jordaan’s category of emerging middle powers, as both countries attained their middle power status after the Cold War. In the last decade, soft power has become an important feature of both countries’ foreign policy agendas. Joseph Nye explains soft power as “the ability to get what you want through attraction rather than coercion or payments.”¹⁴ He claims that soft power is “attractive power, inducing an active change in people’s preferences that in turn change[s] their actions.”¹⁵ The soft power resources of a country consist of three main assets: culture, foreign policy style, and political values.¹⁶ Based on Nye’s argument, a country’s’ cultural richness (e.g., art, literature, language, and popular culture), legitimate foreign policy style (e.g., humanitarian aid policy and mediation efforts), and political systems (e.g., democratic legacy) have the potential to extend the country’s influence in the political realm, enhance its international status, and promote core values of the rules-based international order.

Andrew Cooper and Jongryn Mo note that states with limited material capabilities can punch above their weight in international relations by using their soft power resources.¹⁷ States’ soft power resources are utilized through their public diplomacy strategies. Along with foreign service officers, new public diplomacy practices include non-governmental organizations (NGOs) and private organizations such as universities, news media, the entertainment industry, foundations, and business associations that work together to promote the country’s policies to wider audiences. Public diplomacy strategies aim to establish a favourable image of a country among the foreign public by using the country’s potential soft power resources. During the early years of the Justice and Development Party (Adalet ve Kalkınma Partisi or AKP), Turkey’s rapidly growing economy, cultural diversity, emphasis on democratic values, and historical ties to the surrounding region functioned as the country’s soft power and transformed Turkey into a centre of attraction for both the West and the East.¹⁸ Similarly, in recent years, South Korea’s rising soft power has been growing—a phenomenon that has garnered scholarly attention.¹⁹ Both countries’ soft power potential has been acknowledged by several studies. The Portland Soft Power 30 index provides a comparative assessment of thirty nations’ soft power resources. According to its 2019 report ranking global soft power, South Korea was ranked nineteenth, and Turkey twenty-ninth.²⁰ Based on Nye’s soft power definition, a state that aspires to soft power is more likely to be a pivotal player in promoting the norms and values of the LIO. This is consistent with Joe Biden’s “clash of systems” or “democracy versus autocracy” rhetoric, which aimed to counter the challenges and challengers to the LIO.

With globalization and advancement of communication technologies, cultural diplomacy has become the most preferred model of public diplomacy for engaging foreign audiences. John Holden and Chris Tryhorn stress that cultural diplomacy is “getting companies to invest, encouraging public support for your country’s positions and convincing politicians to turn to it as an ally.”²¹ It attracts targeted groups for further engagement, such as tourism, studying abroad, or buying the country’s products.

The hallyu (“Korean Wave”) refers to the spread of Korean popular culture and the dramatic global increase in the consumption of Korean cultural products since the 1990s. The Korean government has supported the hallyu through tax incentives and government funding for K-dramas, K-pop, and the development of video games—products which are exported to the world. As a result, hallyu has become an effective policy tool for South Korea’s cultural diplomacy. In 2013, the Popular Culture Industry Division was established under the Ministry of Culture, Sports and Tourism (MCST) to facilitate the promotion of popular culture. The department labelled Korean entertainment exports under the “K” title to help consumers identify Korean content such as K-dramas, K-pop, K-beauty, and K-food. As a government-supported phenomenon, hallyu has been nurtured through several government and non-government institutions, including Korean Cultural Centers (KCC) and the King Sejong Institute (KSI or Sejonghakdang) which operates language education centres around the world. To attract foreign audiences, the MCST appointed popular South Korean actor Lee Min-ho as the KSI’s public relations ambassador. The success of Bong Joon Ho’s film Parasite and the global popularity of BTS (Bangtan Sonyeondan or Beyond the Scene), a K-pop boy band, have contributed to increased interest in learning the Korean language at major universities around the world. Following the global success of the K-drama Squid Game, a popular Netflix series, the demand for Korean language learning dramatically increased by 76 percent in the UK and 40 percent in the US.²² Further, with the recent success of Korean dramas and President Yoon Suk Yeol’s visit to the US, Netflix announced its plan to invest an additional US$2.5 billion over the next four years to produce more K-content, aiming to sustain and build on the growing global interest in the K-Wave.²³ To appeal to foreign audiences, the South Korean government frequently uses celebrity power in other areas as well. For instance, after the success of the K-drama Descendants of the Sun (DotS), the Korea Tourism Organization (KTO) appointed the drama’s lead male actor, Song Joong-ki, as the honorary ambassador for Korean tourism in 2016. The role was given to BTS for the next three years, and in 2021, English professional football club Tottenham Hotspur soccer player Son Heung-min was appointed to the role. The KTO also uses hallyu as a marketing strategy to promote tourism by making K-drama film sets into tourist attractions for K-drama fans through hallyu-themed travel packages.

Turkey’s cultural diplomacy strategy has certain distinctions from South Korea’s. Turkey’s cultural activities are run by a single organization, the Yunus Emre Foundation, to export Turkish culture and language abroad. The Yunus Emre Institute (YEI), an institution associated with the Foundation, opened its first cultural centre abroad in 2009. Although Turkish dramas and celebrities are popular in various regions, the Turkish government has not attempted to use the country’s popular culture to attract tourists or endorse Turkish language learning abroad. Turkish television series demonstrate historical, geographical, and cultural similarities to many other regions by depicting Turkish lifestyles that blend liberal, secular, and Muslim values. More than 150 Turkish TV series have been sold in over 100 countries. Muhteşem Yüzyıl (Magnificent Century), a Turkish historical drama that aired from 2011 to 2014, has been broadcast in over forty countries and has reached an audience of more than 500 million. The drama was not funded by the government and has not been used by the AKP to advance Turkish soft power overseas. However, its storyline was consistent with Turkish foreign policy activism in the former Ottoman territories in the early 2010s, and the drama’s popularity in the Middle East increased Turkey’s regional influence and contributed to a rise in Arab tourism to Turkey. Yet, despite the popularity of Muhteşem Yüzyıl and other Turkish TV series, Turkey’s 2023 Tourism Strategy report did not mention TV tourism (e.g., tourists visiting filming locations in Turkey) as one of the country’s top priorities for its tourism diversification strategy.²⁴

Turkish dramas have helped to spread a positive image of Turkey, especially in the Middle East. As a result, during the Arab Spring uprisings, Turkey was promoted by the West as a model of Muslim democracy and as an inspiration for countries undergoing political transitions.²⁵ From the Western point of view, Turkey was a much better model than Iran or Saudi Arabia, as it was closer to a Western-style democracy. Therefore, the promotion of the Turkish model was an opportunity to encourage a regional transition consistent with the LIO’s values. Turkey was seen as a model country that could link the West and the Muslim world to address instabilities and other issues in the regional order. However, Turkey’s domestic problems and increasingly troubled foreign relations with Middle Eastern countries had a negative impact on both its image and TV exports in the region. Due to increasing tension between Turkey and Saudi Arabia, Dubai-based satellite network, MBC Group (which reaches 400 million people in the region), stopped airing Turkish TV series.²⁶ The two countries’ relations deteriorated following Turkey’s support for Qatar during the blockade imposed by Arab countries in 2017, the deployment of Turkish troops to Qatar, and the assassination of Saudi dissident journalist Jamal Khashoggi at the Saudi consulate in Istanbul. To amend the deep economic problems prior to the 2023 presidential and general elections, President Recep Tayyip Erdoğan launched an initiative to normalize relations with Turkey’s neighbouring countries, including Saudi Arabia, the United Arab Emirates, and Egypt. The effect of this initiative on Turkey’s economy and cultural diplomacy is yet to be seen.

In a similar vein, South Korea has faced challenges to the spread of hallyu in Asia due to a regional state of crisis. The deployment of the US missile defence system, Terminal High Altitude Area Defense (THAAD), in South Korea in 2016 to defend against North Korean missiles led to the deterioration of South Korea’s relations with China. Relations may not fully recover in the foreseeable future, Sukhee Han writes, as the THAAD controversy and China’s economic retaliation have caused mutual distrust between the two Asian neighbours.²⁷ Han notes that while China sees South Korea’s decision to deploy THAAD as a betrayal of its support, South Korea sees China’s response as economic bullying.²⁸ China is not only South Korea’s top economic partner; it was also the largest hallyu market. China’s retaliation for the deployment of THAAD extendedbeyond economic boycotts: it also prohibited travel agencies from selling package tours to Korea and imposed an unofficial ban on Korean entertainment industry content, including music streaming services, K-dramas, and all K-pop acts. In this sense, the THAAD crisis became an opportunity for Beijing to limit Korea’s increasing cultural influence in China. Despite these bans and China’s economic retaliation, Korean celebrities continue to appeal to Chinese youth. To limit their influence and engagement with Chinese fans, Chinese authorities suspended several K-pop accounts on the Chinese social networking site Weibo.²⁹ These moves must be seen in a wider ideological context. During the Cold War, Western cultural exports contributed to the undermining of the Soviet Union and the erosion of communist ideology. South Korea’s growing cultural influence presents a similar opportunity to penetrate undemocratic regimes around the world today. Therefore, South Korea has the potential, both regionally and globally, to promote the LIO by exporting Western-aligned ideals and values through soft power initiatives as a US ally.

Nissim Otmazgin argues that popular culture plays an important role in shaping the East Asian region by “creating transnational markets for cultural commodities and by disseminating communalities of lifestyles and concepts, which are based on the experience of consuming the same cultural products by different people in different parts of East Asia.”³⁰ The dissemination of Korean cultural products has transcended geographical boundaries, connecting youth around the world. Referencing the cultural phenomenon of the mid-1960s wherein the increasing popularity of British culture in the US was described as “the British invasion,” Sue Mi Terry refers to hallyu as “the Korean invasion.” Terry argues that South Korea’s growing cultural exports not only increase cross-cultural ties with its neighbours, but also boost the country’s geopolitical influence in the surrounding region and the world.³¹ The participatory and shared culture of global hallyu fans enhance these increasingly cross-cultural ties between Korea and the world. According to the March 2024 Korea Foundation (KF)³² and Ministry of Foreign Affairs report on hallyu‘s global popularity, the number of hallyu fans in December 2023 surpassed 225 million in 119 countries, up from only 9.26 million hallyu fans globally in 2012.³³ The number of hallyu fan clubs also increased to 1,748 from 757 in 2012.³⁴ Irina Lyan and Alon Levkowitz describe hallyu fans as cultural ambassadors and cultural missionaries who actively try to introduce Korean popular culture to others.³⁵ Leaders around the world also recognize the power of K-pop fanbases and the K-pop industry. During a joint press conference between then South Korean president Moon Jae-in and then US president Joe Biden, Biden acknowledged K-pop fans by stating that “K-pop fans are universal.”³⁶ In 2021, Turkish opposition party leader Kemal Kılıçdaroğlu shared his Spotify playlist, which mainly included K-pop songs, on Twitter in an attempt to win over Generation Z, the expected decisive voting bloc in the 2023 Turkish presidential and general elections.³⁷

To overcome the regional setbacks, the Korean government has focused on promoting of hallyu in overseas markets and creating and exporting hallyu content by launching the Hallyu Support and Cooperation Division as well as the Korea Federation of Content Creators (KFCC). The KFCC connects Korean content creators with their audiences and commercial partners; it also introduces foreign content creators to Korea and helps domestic ones advance abroad.³⁸ A 2022 MCST and KF report on the “Korean Wave” revealed that the number of hallyu-related posts on YouTube had increased thirty-fold in a period of three months after the September 2021 release of Squid Game.³⁹ YouTubers in Korea and abroad became the most powerful agents in amplifying Korean culture and played a key role in spreading and maintaining the global influence of hallyu. Although hallyu is a government-backed phenomenon, the recent rise of Korea’s soft power is mainly facilitated by non-state actors, including fandoms and cultural workers. These new agents attract more attention than any cultural initiatives organized by the Korean government. Nevertheless, the government’s investment in content creation in various fields encourages young Koreans to pursue creative jobs and mobilizes the country’s human resources in cultural-export-oriented businesses. To further foster the growth of hallyu, the Korean Culture and Information Service (KOCIS) has launched the K-influencer Academy and Honorary Reporters programs to encourage non-Korean nationals to produce Korean cultural content, such as articles and videos on any topic related to Korea.⁴⁰ These programs provide equipment, funding, and training for selected participants to transform them into Global Korean Culture Ambassadors and expand K-content exports.

In 2005, Turkey and Spain jointly launched the Alliance of Civilizations (AoC) forum to promote harmony and peaceful co-existence among cultures. The AoC was later adopted by the UN Secretary-General as a UN initiative. During the early years of AKP rule, Turkey actively engaged in several conflict resolution attempts, such as establishing reconciliation efforts in Iraq, Lebanon, and Kyrgyzstan, and mediating between Iran and the West on Iran’s nuclear program. Turkey launched the Mediation for Peace initiative with Finland in 2010, which was also adopted as a UN General Assembly resolution. As an emerging middle power, Turkey had high regional orientation and aimed to play a constructive role in conflict resolutions and be a regional leader. Turkey’s soft-power-oriented policies led to a new vision in Turkish foreign policy. Turkey’s diplomatic activism was rewarded by the international community at the UN General Assembly, and Turkey was elected as a non-permanent member of the UN Security Council (UNSC) for the 2009–2010 term. The AKP’s multi-track foreign policy vision encouraged business organizations and faith-based relief NGOs to contribute economically in various regions. The Islamic identity of the humanitarian NGOs shaped their activities: they focused on the regions where Muslims were oppressed, mostly in former Ottoman territories.⁴¹ Turkey’s selective foreign policy and humanitarian aid program in Muslim countries go hand in hand with its Turkish cultural diplomacy strategy, which includes promoting the state-backed TV series Diriliş: Ertuğrul (Resurrection: Ertugrul) in Muslim countries, a historical drama that glorifies Islamic values.

Turkey’s worsening relations with its neighbours, its disagreements with the West over the future of the Syrian regime and Kurdish militias (People’s Protection Units, YPG), and its unresolved conflict with the Kurdistan Workers’ Party (PKK) have damaged its role as a credible mediator and facilitator. Turkey’s purchase of Russian S-400 air defence systems and its cross-border operations in northern Iraq and Syria demonstrate its hard power practices and its return to security-oriented policies. Turkey’s increasing isolation in regional and world politics was made salient when it ran for a non-permanent seat on the UN Security Council in 2014. In the General Assembly, the country received only 60 votes out of 193 for the Security Council seat, as compared to the 151 it received in 2008. Turkey’s deteriorating relationship with the US and Western countries in general made it difficult to gain support for its candidacy. After the delivery of the first batch of S-400 missile system in July 2019, the US initiated Turkey’s removal from the F-35 new generation fighter jets programme. As a result, in December 2020, the Countering America’s Adversaries Through Sanctions Act (CAATSA) was imposed on Turkey’s Presidency of Defence Industries.⁴²

Mustafa Kutlay and Ziya Öniş argue that as a result of the ongoing changes in world order, Turkey seeks strategic autonomy through military activism and coercive diplomacy, including confrontations with its Western allies.⁴³ Alternatively, Mehtap Kara argues that Turkey’s military operations in Syria and military activism in the region constitute the AKP regime’s “diversionary war strategy,” designed to divert people’s attention from divisive domestic problems, especially during election periods.⁴⁴ She also argues that Turkey pursues a hedging strategy to achieve a balanced relationship with competing great powers to keep its strategic autonomy.⁴⁵ These developments have transformed Turkey into a spoiler of regional peace rather than a supporter of the LIO in its surrounding regions.⁴⁶ Turkish elites have increasingly become skeptical of liberal values, and frequently express their frustration about Western institutions. While Turkey’s interest in Western institutions such as the European Union (EU) is declining due to the problematic membership process, the Erdoğan regime has expressed an interest in Turkey joining Russia-China dominated groupings such as the Shanghai Cooperation Organisation (SCO) and BRICS.⁴⁷ In September 2022, during the SCO summit in Uzbekistan, Erdoğan expressed his goal for Turkey to gain SCO membership.⁴⁸ In October 2024, Turkey officially applied to join BRICS, despite being a NATO member and candidate to the join the EU.⁴⁹ Turkey’s interest in joining BRICS goes back to the tenth BRICS Leaders’ Summit in South Africa in 2018. Turkish officials claimed that BRICS membership is an opportunity for economic cooperation with member states, rather than an alternative to the country’s ties with Western allies. However, both the SCO and BRICS remain hostile to the LIO and favour multipolarity. In his recent article, Jordaan describes the increasing preference of emerging middle powers’ for multipolarity as a shift likely to challenge their previous roles as international stabilizers or supporters of liberal hegemonic projects.⁵⁰ He underlines that while traditional middle powers act as international stabilizers of the system, non-traditional middle powers, or Southern middle powers, prefer multipolarity and have counter-hegemonic destabilizing tendencies.⁵¹ Turkey is an example of this growing number of non-aligned, new middle powers, whereas South Korea positions itself as a close US ally that actively supports the LIO. Turkey’s deteriorating relations with its Western allies, coupled with the country’s military adventurism and lack of commitment to democratic norms, have damaged not only its soft power ambitions but also its role in supporting and legitimizing the LIO.

Emerging middle powers’ high regional orientation and eagerness for regional cooperation and integration make both Turkey and South Korea potential bridges between Western and non-Western countries, as well as between developed and developing countries. During the Arab Spring uprisings, Turkey was promoted as a model of democracy, and during the Eurozone crisis, South Korea was proposed as a development model. Both emerging middle powers’ political and economic norm promotion is most significant in their surrounding regions, where they concentrate their humanitarian assistance, development aid programs, and cultural diplomacy efforts. However, both states also strive to contribute to the international order globally, within their limited capacity. They show awareness of global issues, such as Turkey’s sensitivity in humanitarian diplomacy and South Korea’s concerns over environmental problems. Turkey’s “open door” policy for Syrian refugees strengthened Turkey’s image as a humanitarian actor. Turkey currently hosts over 4 million refugees, as the world’s largest refugee-hosting country. According to the Development Initiative’s 2020 Global Humanitarian Assistance Report, Turkey spent the largest share of gross national income (GNI) as international humanitarian assistance, contributing $7.6 billion, and in 2021, while many small countries’ contributions declined, Turkey increased its humanitarian assistance to $8 billion.⁵² However, this assistance was spent internally to host Syrian refugees within Turkey, so Turkey’s contribution is not directly comparable with other donors’ humanitarian assistance. Meanwhile, South Korea has been successfully transforming itself a primary actor in global environmental governance by promoting its “Green New Deal” program, which aims to transform its fossil-fuel-reliant economy into one powered by eco-friendly energy).⁵³

Through contributions to foreign aid, middle-power states aim to enhance their reputations with the foreign public. Based on the Development Assistance Committee (DAC)’s 2021 preliminary data, South Korea’s official development assistance (ODA) amounted to $2.8 billion, 0.16% of its GNI, of which $1.3 billion was bilateral aid, $710 million multilateral aid, and $780 million bilateral loans.⁵⁴ South Korea’s ODA focuses on bilateral aid rather than multilateral aid. Africa’s economic potential and young population have made the continent a new market for the commercial expansion of Asia’s fourth-largest economy, South Korea. The first South Korea–Africa Summit was held on 4 June 2024. Africa has a population of 1.4 billion people, of whom 60 percent are under the age of twenty-five. This makes the continent an important workforce centre: Africans will constitute one third of the global working population by 2050.⁵⁵ Declining birth rates in South Korea, along with projections that half the country’s population will be over the age of seventy by 2050, make Africa’s growing youth population important for addressing South Korea’s shrinking labour force.⁵⁶ South Korean companies may find it easier to access the African market through the popularity of the Korean Wave, which creates receptive conditions for the country’s businesses to enter and develop on the continent. Following Turkey’s example, Korea International Cooperation Agency (KOICA), the cooperation and aid agency of Korea, is already actively working with Korean companies to help build hospitals and medical facilities in poor and developing countries in the continent, including Ghana, Mozambique, and Rwanda.⁵⁷

Meanwhile, Turkey’s total 2021 ODA is reported as $7.6 billion, exceeding the 0.7% ODA/GNI target with 0.95%, of which $7.57 billion was in the form of bilateral grants and $63 million was multilateral aid.⁵⁸ Turkey’s ODA distribution is also mainly bilateral grants. Although most of Turkey’s ODA goes to Muslim countries, the Turkish Cooperation and Coordination Agency (TIKA) also actively works to promote Turkey’s engagement in Africa by building schools and hospitals in the region. Turkey’s engagement in Sub-Saharan Africa includes humanitarian aid and cooperation in the defence sector to boost Turkey’s international status. Turkey’s growing presence in the continent positions the country not only as an alternative economic and political development model (a mix of neoliberalism and competitive authoritarianism) to both the Western and Chinese models, but also as an influential actor for resisting the Russian and Chinese presence there.⁵⁹

John Ikenberry argues that the war in Ukraine has created three geopolitical and ideological groupings: the global West (US and Europe), the global East (China and Russia), and the global South (non-western countries mainly led by geographically and economically key players such as India, Brazil, Indonesia, and Turkey).⁶⁰ He underlines that competition takes place not only between great powers, but also between these “Three Worlds,” as shown by the debate triggered by the war in Ukraine over the LIO and its future.⁶¹ It is important for great powers, both in the global West and the global East, to compete for support from the global South. Therefore, secondary states are important either for maintaining the US-led order or transforming it into the China-Russia led multipolar international order. In the last two decades, Turkey has increased its engagement with Africa strategically through the elements of soft power in its foreign policy. The country’s national carrier and most reputable brand, Turkish Airlines, has become a main facilitator and connectivity agent, contributing to the expansion of trade relations in the horn of Africa in support of Turkey’s regional goals.⁶² Turkey has the third-largest foreign representation in the world in 2023, it operates 252 posts, positioning itself as diplomatic key actor in the global South.⁶³ Turkey’s cultural, economic, political, and military cooperation with regional countries makes it a significant partner in resisting the rising Chinese and Russian influence in the African region. This could serve as an asset for the Western alliance in an era of emerging great-power competition due to the economic potential and natural resources of the continent.⁶⁴ Turkey’s increasing activism and the popularity of its defence sector not only boost the country’s relations with African countries, but also elevate its international status.⁶⁵ Therefore, despite the country’s declining commitment to democratic values, Turkey’s engagement with African countries makes it a valuable partner for Western countries to counter the growing Chinese and Russian influence in the region. On the other hand, Turkey’s stance on reform of the LIO and the fragmented world order vision it shares with Russia and China—in which Turkey believes it will have greater weight and representation—simultaneously challenge the American goal of maintaining the US-led order.

Emerging middle powers do not have material resources for largescale donations compared to traditional middle powers. Instead, they use their limited foreign and humanitarian aid programs in ways that can be framed as “heroic.”⁶⁶ Turkey’s health diplomacy during the Covid-19 pandemic is an example of such an attempt to (re)construct the country’s regional leadership role in the Balkans by providing medical aid mainly to former Ottoman territories.⁶⁷ Similarly, the Korean government authorized the provision of KRW 36 billion (roughly US$33 million) in 2020 for a grant aid program to help developing countries recover from the pandemic.⁶⁸ Despite both countries’ relatively limited capacities, these “heroic” aid grants can increase publicity and visibility for the countries, providing an opportunity to strengthen their economic and political relations as well as expand their cultural export markets in targeted countries.

While Turkey’s foreign policy toolbox has mainly included hard power elements in recent years, the Korean government has begun using the country’s cultural diplomacy and Korean celebrities to promote its policies abroad. The President’s Office officially assigned a diplomatic role to BTS as “special presidential envoy for future generations and culture” to promote global diplomacy and attract the interest of younger generations across the world. As newly appointed celebrity diplomats and presidential envoy, the group members received diplomatic passports to accompany the president for the seventy-sixth session of the UN General Assembly in September 2021, which highlighted climate action, the pandemic, and the importance of vaccines and sustainable development goals. At this point, BTS has more appeal to global youth than any diplomat or political leader. In both 2018 and 2019, Time magazine named the group in its list of the 100 most influential people as “next generation leaders.” BTS’s attendance at the UN General Assembly helped to expand communication with youth around the world and to enhance South Korea’s soft power as a responsible global actor. The use of popular culture to raise awareness about the country’s foreign policy agenda is not a new phenomenon in Korean politics. For instance, during the country’s UNSC non-permanent membership tenure in 2013–2014, the South Korean government expressed its desire to increase the country’s participation in UN peacekeeping missions. Two years later, K-drama DotS (set during a military operation in a fictional war-torn country) highlighted South Korea’s growing peacekeeping agenda through its global cultural reach. In this way, DotS contributed to the government’s attempt to change the country’s image from a security-consuming to a security-providing country.

The administration of President Moon Jae-in launched the New Southern Policy (NSP) to boost the country’s soft power capacity by strengthening ties with Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN) countries and India. As a diplomatic initiative, the NSP seeks to elevate South Korea’s role in regional and global governance. It aimed to establish a community based on three main pillars: people (connecting people to people), peace (supporting regional peace and security), and prosperity (advancing mutually beneficial economic cooperation).⁶⁹ The NSP represents successful middle-power diplomacy, reflecting key characteristics of middle powers, including multilateralism, coalition-building, good international citizenship, niche diplomacy, and bridging efforts.⁷⁰ Although the NSP was an attempt to maintain and ensure the country’s autonomy and geopolitical independence, it simultaneously helped to enhance American interests in the region. The NSP provided support for Korean companies to participate in infrastructure projects, spread hallyu, and expanded markets for the country’s cultural exports. By strengthening cross-cultural, economic, and political ties among regional countries, the NSP also offered an opportunity to balance against China’s growing influence in the region. Therefore, the NSP’s regional cooperation policies demonstrate South Korea’s high regional orientation and reinforce the ASEAN-led regional architecture based on US priorities and its vision for a Free and Open Indo-Pacific (FOIP).⁷¹ The Yoon administration continued the country’s engagement with ASEAN and launched the ROK-ASEAN Solidarity Initiative in 2022. However, instead of continuing the ambiguous and balanced approach between the US and China, the Yoon administration has pursued strategic clarity and started openly countering China’s influence by reaffirming South Korea’s alignment with the US. South Korea’s first Indo-Pacific strategy report is in line with the US Indo-Pacific strategy. The report outlines the region’s strategic importance for South Korea, particularly due to its key strategic shipping routes, stating that “the Indo-Pacific represents approximately 78% and 67% of our total exports and total imports.”⁷² The report also underlines Seoul’s commitment to the LIO: “We will uphold international norms and strengthen a rules-based order[.]”⁷³ Through this report, the Yoon administration employed rhetoric about the rules-based international order rhetoric to call for solidarity among like-minded Indo-Pacific nations and for a regional order shaped by international norms rather than by force or coercion.

While Turkish commitment to the Western alliance is in decline, South Korea demonstrates solidarity with the West. Korean president Yoon Suk Yeol has declared that his administration is committed to strengthening its alliance with the US, having a tougher stance on China, stepping up the country’s role in maintaining the “free and open Indo-Pacific,” and embracing a broader regional and global role for South Korea than that of the previous Moon Jae-in administration.⁷⁴ South Korea’s international profile has been raised by Biden’s visits to South Korea during his tour of Asia, as well as BTS’s invitation to the White House to speak about hate crimes against Asians and the group members’ meeting with President Biden in the Oval Office. Yoon and Biden, after meeting together, released a joint statement that reaffirmed both countries’ commitment to the strategic alliance and to “oppos[ing] all activities that undermine, destabilize, or threaten the rules-based international order.”⁷⁵ South Korea was invited with Japan, Australia, and New Zealand to the NATO Summit in Madrid in June 2022 (and the next two years) as observers to demonstrate the joint commitment of NATO and the Indo-Pacific partners to defending the rules-based international order. South Korea was also invited as a guest country to join the G7 Summit. These developments have allowed South Korea, as an Indo-Pacific partner, to play a greater global role in bridging the Indo-Pacific and the NATO alliance during the Biden administration.

While South Korea is perceived as an active supporter of the American-led LIO, Turkey stands at the opposite end of the political spectrum despite being a NATO ally. Before the 2022 NATO Summit, Turkey threatened to block NATO’s Nordic expansion on the basis that both Finland and Sweden support terror organizations, referring to the PKK. Despite growing Russian aggression in Europe, Turkey capitalized on NATO enlargement as an opportunity to pressure both countries into amending their terror laws and to push NATO allies to lift sanctions on Turkey’s defence industry. Turkey later withdrew its veto, but resisted and slowed down NATO’s quick expansion to get concessions and elevate Turkey’s position in the alliance. These behaviours raise concerns that in future Turkey might hijack the transatlantic alliance again to get concessions and/or gain support for its military interventionism.⁷⁶ Turkey performed a balancing act between the US and Russia over the war in Ukraine and hedged its bets against the uncertainties surrounding the future of the international order, instead of demonstrating strong solidarity against challenges to the LIO. While Ankara refused to join the Western sanctions regime against Russia, Seoul imposed sanctions on Russia. It is also important to note that Turkey’s neutral position in the Ukraine war raised opportunities to play a mediator role between Moscow and Kyiv. While Turkey’s efforts failed to bring an end to the conflict, its success in facilitating a grain shipments deal is evidence of its potential for a larger role in mediating between the West and Russia. Therefore, Turkey’s current position might not be pro-Western, but it should not be seen as entirely pro-Russian either.

In the early 2000s, the AKP initiated a series of liberalizing reforms in an attempt to meet the Copenhagen political criteria for EU membership. During this period, Turkey projected a new image abroad of a country increasingly committed to democracy. This renewedfocus on the prioritizing of individual freedoms became the main pillar of Turkish soft power, with the aim to transform Turkey into a centre of attraction. However, the growing domestic dissidence against the AKP’s policies and the government’s increasing restrictions on civil liberties undermined the dominant Turkish public diplomacy narrative. The civilian unrest and police brutality during the Gezi Park protests in June 2013 negatively affected Turkey’s image and ended the promotion of the Turkish model, which waspart Turkey’s soft power strategy in the region. As a result of renewed conflict with the PKK and the collapse of the Kurdish peace process, curfews were declared as part of anti-terror operations in southeastern provinces. Between 2015 and 2017, more than 250 curfews were imposed in Turkey.⁷⁷ Following the failed coup of 15 July 2016, the AKP government announced a three-month state of emergency, which was extended by the Turkish parliament and remained in effect for almost two years. In recent years, citizens’ freedoms have been violated on various occasions for the sake of national security. In 2018, Turkish democracy was weakened with the transition from a parliamentary to a presidential system, which led to centralized executive power and undermined checks and balances. Following the Gezi Park protests, Erdoğan’s growing personal dominance evolved into authoritarian populism, and the transition from the parliamentary to presidential system allowed him to further consolidate his executive power.⁷⁸

Human rights abuses are common in emerging middle-power countries with fragile democracies. According to the 2023 Human Rights Watch (HRW) World Report, the detention and conviction of journalists, activists, and opposition politicians with alleged links to the Fethullah Terrorist Organization (FETO)—believed to have been behind the coup attempt—or to the PKK continue without compelling evidence of their crimes, despite the end of the state of emergency.⁷⁹ Since early 2021, the AKP leadership has continuously criminalized the pro-Kurdish Peoples’ Democratic Party (Halkların Demokratik Partisi, HDP) as a pro-PKK party, and initiated a Constitutional Court indictment to close the third-largest party in parliament. Several of the HDP’s MPs were banned from politics, including co-leaders Selahattin Demirtaş and Figen Yüksekdağ, who were arrested on charges of being associated with the PKK. Despite calls from Western countries for the release of activist Osman Kavala, who has been in jail since 2017 on accusations of his involvement in the Gezi Park protests and the failed coup, Kavala was sentenced to life imprisonment. The erosion of democracy in Turkey became an important issue for its Western allies, as it contradicts liberal norms. The 2024 World Justice Project: Rule of Law Index ranks Turkey 117th out of 142 countries for adherence to the rule of law; South Korea is ranked 19th.⁸⁰ In terms of constraints on government powers, Turkey is ranked 135/142, only above Sudan, Myanmar, Belarus, Cambodia, Egypt, Nicaragua, and Venezuela.⁸¹ Turkey’s global ranking for fundamental rights is 133/142. With its increasingly authoritarian tendencies, Turkey has not only lost its soft power but has also become a perceived threat to the rules-based international order.

South Korea’s political system has also been undermined by high-level corruption and collusion among the political elites and the powerful family-run conglomerates known as chaebol. In December 2016, South Korea’s first female president, Park Geun-hye, became the first democratically elected leader to be impeached. She was removed from office in March 2017 and later sentenced to twenty-four years in prison after being found guilty of bribery, coercion, and abuse of power involving South Korea’s top business conglomerates, including Samsung and Lotte.⁸² Six months after Park’s conviction, her predecessor, Lee Myung-bak, who served as president from 2008 to 2013, was also arrested and sentenced to fifteen years in prison on similar charges. These convictions are evidence of the functioning democratic institutions in South Korea and are perceived as a step forward in consolidating the country’s democracy.⁸³ Nonetheless, according to the 2023 HRW report, despite democratic progress, the Korean government continues to maintain restrictions on freedom of expression, association, and assembly.⁸⁴ There are notable discrimination and human rights violations, particularly against certain groups such as women, migrants, minority groups, and lesbian, gay, bisexual, and transgender (LGBT) persons.⁸⁵ The LGBT movement faces resistance, and the Pride parade in Seoul is often subject to local restrictions, especially from conservatives. In a similar context, in July 2018, Turkish provincial governors were granted expanded powers to restrict movement and assemblies, measures which were used to prevent demonstrations in the Kurdish southeast and public gatherings of LGBT rights groups. The Istanbul annual Pride march has not been allowed since 2015. According to the 2023 HRW report, although in 2022 the government in Seoul moved to ban semi-basement flats (banjiha)—symbolic of the low incomes and growing inequality in the country, the fourth-largest economy in Asia—the August 2023 flooding, in which forty-seven people died, highlighted the unresolved issue. This drew attention to the country’s economic inequality, reinforcing the global awareness sparked by the Oscar-winning film Parasite and its depiction of banjiha.⁸⁶

Freedom House, in its 2025 annual report assessing political rights and civil liberties in 208 countries and territories, gives South Korea a total score of 81 in its “global freedom” scores, describing it as “free,” while Turkey, with a score of 33, is described as “not free.”⁸⁷ In terms of “internet freedom” scores, South Korea’s score is 66, “partly free,” whereas Turkey’s score is 31, “not free.”⁸⁸ In V-Dem Institute’s 2025 Democracy Report, South Korea is categorized as an “electoral democracy,” having dropped from the list of “liberal democracies” due to a decline in its level of democratization under President Yoon both in 2023 and 2024. The country is ranked 41st among “electoral democracies,” whereas Turkey is ranked 139th in the group classified as “electoral autocracies.”⁸⁹ This helps to explain why both Turkey and South Korea are still to be considered emerging middle powers, rather than traditional middle powers. However, despite its shortcomings and setbacks, South Korea demonstrates a stronger commitment to democratic consolidation than Turkey does, which contributes to the success of its middle-power diplomacy and soft power projection. In contrast, Turkey’s human rights problems, censored media, and lack of judicial independence have become the Achilles’ heel of its soft power.

Countries’ democratic experiences are an important component of cultural industries and cultural diplomacy. The Korean government encourages investment in the local film industry and allows freedom of expression in the entertainment industry. As part of the country’s democratization process, the Korean film industry shifted from control to promotion—except during the period of Park’s presidency, when nearly 10,000 artists were blacklisted, including the director of Parasite for his critical and satirical style. Parasite and Squid Game are examples of the increasing freedom of expression in the Korean entertainment industry. Both productions are critical of the capitalist system, income inequality, and the unequal domestic distribution of wealth in South Korea, criticisms that resonate with millions around the world. The global success of both productions demonstrates how important it is to remove government pressure from the film and broader liberal arts industries to encourage rapid growth.

Authorities in Turkey also provide incentives to promote Turkey’s film industry, but freedom of expression remains highly controversial due to the AKP’s interventionist policies. For instance, members of the AKP submitted a parliamentary petition to ban the broadcast of Muhteşem Yüzyıl on the grounds that its portrayal of Sultan Süleyman’s private life contained historical inaccuracies. Despite this, the series later became the main cultural export of the country. Beside these problems, government-backed productions such as Diriliş: Ertuğrul mostly focus on promoting the AKP’s current populist policies. The rising authoritarianism in Turkey has put pressure on the entertainment industry through censorship and increasing government control. Most of the celebrities have left-leaning views and are critical of the AKP’s growing authoritarian tendencies, especially after the Gezi Park protests. Although there is no concrete evidence of blacklisting, many celebrities have been dismissed from government-supported projects, restricted from TV appearances, and targeted by online smear campaigns since the Gezi Park protests. The decline in democratization has deepened societal polarization and alienated artists who could otherwise function as cultural assets and important agents of the country’s public diplomacy. The recent developments highlight the deepening divide between the Erdoğan regime and Turkish celebrities. In January 2025, twelve years after the Gezi Park protests, a group of celebrities—including Halit Ergenç, the lead actor of Muhteşem Yüzyıl—were called to testify in connection with their agent, Ayşe Barım. Barım had been detained and accused of encouraging celebrities under her management to participate in the 2013 nationwide anti-government Gezi protests, which the Erdogan regime calls an attempt to overthrow the Turkish government under Article 312 of the Criminal Code.⁹⁰ This move was most likely an attempt to intimidate these public figures and discourage them from supporting the mayor of Istanbul, Ekrem İmamoğlu, amid an anticipated political crisis that could spark large-scale protests similar to those of Gezi Park. On 19 March 2025, İmamoğlu, considered the strongest candidate of the opposition party in the next presidential election, was arrested on charges of corruption and aiding terrorism.⁹¹ The celebrities who chose to speak up about this issue were immediately removed from ongoing state-funded TV projects. These events demonstrate the link between democratic values and cultural diplomacy. In the long term, these developments and the democratic backsliding in the country are expected to undermine the Turkish entertainment industry and the sustainable growth of Turkish cultural exports, especially TV series.

Michael Green highlights South Korea’s possible role in Asia’s emerging regional architecture and global governance. He argues that South Korea is not only a bridge between the developed and developing worlds or between the East and the West, but that it should also have the confidence to pursue a community-building vision in the Indo-Pacific region by actively promoting democratic norms in its diplomacy.⁹² South Korea’s commitment to democratic values is important for promoting democratic norms in the region and limiting China’s influence by offering its Western model of democracy as an alternative to the Chinese model of governance. South Korea’s cultural influence, high regional orientation, and commitment to democratic values have made it an active supporter of the LIO and a key pillar of the US’s Asia strategy, particularly during the Biden administration. Meanwhile, Turkey’s democratic backsliding has contributed to its declining soft power. Instead of being an active supporter and legitimizer of the LIO, Turkey has become an actor that continuously undermines liberal norms. However, despite democratic backsliding in the country, the Parrot Analytics data firm found that global demand for Turkish television dramas grew by 184 percent between 2020 and 2023, compared with 73 percent for Korean shows. The latest data also shows that, following the US and UK, Turkey is the third-largest exporter of scripted shows.⁹³

The OECD’s 2021 income inequality data illustrates that the domestic distribution of wealth remains highly unequal in both Turkey and South Korea.⁹⁴ According to gender wage gap statistics, South Korea is the highest by far (at 29 percent) among OECD countries.⁹⁵ Squid Game fuelled the Korean entertainment industry and increased interest in Korean cultural products, but the drama also drew attention to the deepening inequality in the country, one of the most prosperous economies in the world (the tenth-largest) and a development model country. According to the OECD’s data, South Korea’s poverty rate among the elderly (people over sixty-five) is among the highest worldwide—following Costa Rica, the US, Brazil, and Turkey.⁹⁶ The country has one of the highest suicide rates in the world and the highest among the OECD countries since 2003.⁹⁷ Suicide among the elderly is mostly due to poverty-related problems.⁹⁸ In the first season of Squid Game, “Player 001,” the oldest contestant in the game, represents the problem of elderly poverty in South Korea. Like the other players who are in debt or otherwise financially struggling, he joins the deadly game to compete for the grand prize—and, regardless of the later plot twist, his character is meant to highlight the desperation and neglect experienced by the country’s elderly population.

Economic frustrations are likely to deepen existing division within societies and raise concerns over undemocratic practices. Despite the success of hallyu and the positive developments in democracy, income inequality and chronic corruption pose threats to South Korea’s efforts to consolidate its liberal democracy, and are likely to have a negative impact on the country’s cultural diplomacy. Turkey’s rapid progress in democratization, followed by setbacks and undemocratic practices, should be a lesson for other emerging middle-power countries and for their soft power aspirations.

To continue democratic progress, during the US–South Korea Summit in May 2021, both countries agreed to launch democracy and governance consultations for coordination in human rights and democracy in South Korea and the region.⁹⁹ The first meeting was held on 15 October 2021. As a part of its “democracies versus authoritarian” discourse, the Biden administration held the Summit for Democracy in December 2021. While Turkey was not invited to the summit, South Korea played a leading role. South Korea became the co-host of the 2022 summit for the Indo-Pacific region, and hosted the third Summit for Democracy in March 2024.¹⁰⁰ Hallyu‘s success and Korea’s growing cultural exports should not be seen merely as a recent surge in popularity of K-pop and K-dramas, but rather as a concerted effort on the part of the Korean government to nurture the entertainment industry and investment in the diverse sectors of the country’s popular culture, including music, TV series, movies, and cosmetics. The country’s increasing democratic values and free civil society have strengthened the country’s soft power, as government censorship in the arts, cinema, literature, and news media has gradually declined following the country’s transition to democracy in 1987. However, Yoon’s unanticipated declaration of martial law on 3 December 2024 posed a threat to South Korea’s efforts to project itself as a country that promotes democratic ideals. Yoon’s imposition of martial law was lifted within hours after the National Assembly voted unanimously against it, and Yoon’s subsequent impeachment and suspension from office on 14 December demonstrate Korea’s functioning democratic institutions, despite its shortcomings. Four months after the declaration of martial law on 4 April 2025, the Constitutional Court ruled to officially remove President Yoon from office, citing a grave violation of democratic norms and the rule of law, and violating the Constitution by declaring martial law without legitimate cause.¹⁰¹ Yoon has become the second sitting president to be removed by the Constitutional Court. While domestic political instability threatens to weaken the US–South Korea alliance founded on mutual commitment to liberal democratic values,¹⁰² it is not expected to have a major effect on South Korea’s booming popular culture or cultural export industry as of today.¹⁰³ In the long-term, however, as we have seen in the case of US–Turkey relations, the weakening of US–Korea ties that may come of this development could overshadow the success of hallyu, especially in Western countries. Leadership transitions, both in the US and South Korea—specifically, the return of Trump in America and the possibility of the main opposition, Democratic Party of Korea (DPK), gaining control in South Korea in the upcoming snap election in 3 June —are likely to heighten uncertainties in the US–South Korea alliance as the DPK advocates for more balanced policies towards the US and China and managing relations with China and Russia, rather than choosing one side over the other in the ongoing great-power competition. ¹⁰⁴ During his first administration, Trump requested an increase in South Korea’s defence cost-sharing, and during the 2024 election campaign, he constantly criticized the country for being a security free rider.¹⁰⁵ With the return of Trump and concerns about the reliability of America’s commitment to defend its allies, the debate over whether South Korea should develop its own nuclear weapons (to defend itself against North Korea) has intensified.¹⁰⁶ If Seoul chooses to develop its own bomb, it could face international sanctions, which may damage the country’s soft power appeal around the world.

Human rights issues, international law, and upholding the rules-based international order will not be a priority for the second Trump administration. While the Biden administration initially claimed that human rights would be a priority in America’s foreign policy, during the last four years, his administration also hesitated to confront US allies on their human rights abuses, and reacted inconsistently in some cases, contributing to a perception of American hypocrisy. For instance, while the Biden administration was critical of Russia’s war crimes in Ukraine and supported international institutions such as the UN and the International Criminal Court (ICC), it was reluctant to criticize Israel’s military aggression in Gaza—continuing to send arms to Israel, despite the country’s violation of the laws of war in Gaza, and blocking international efforts to hold the Israeli government accountable.¹⁰⁷ Similarly, the US has deepened its strategic partnership with India while overlooking the Narendra Modi government’s human rights abuses against religious and other minority groups, and has increased its defence ties with Saudi Arabia despite Crown Prince Mohammed bin Salman’s role in the killing of journalist Jamal Khashoggi.¹⁰⁸ The Biden administration’s efforts to draw these global swing states away from China and Russia have come at the cost of promoting universal values such as human rights and international law.¹⁰⁹ While Turkey was also regarded as one of the six swing states and expected to be influential in determining the future of the international order, since the Barack Obama administration, American officials have treated the Erdoğan regime and democratic erosion in the country quite differently from other global swing states such as Saudi Arabia and India. This contradictory approach and selective application of universal values has undermined American credibility, especially in the global South, where many have long perceived hypocrisy in the US’s promotion of liberal values. As a result, the Biden administration’s attempt to frame emerging competition with China and Russia as a struggle between democracies and autocracies has limited appeal in the global South.

Countries capable of projecting their soft power regionally and globally are potentially promising actors in helping to sustain the rules-based international order. Korean popular culture, especially K-pop and K-dramas, are helping to win the hearts and minds of foreign audiences. South Korea’s commitment to democracy and values-based foreign policy fuel the country’s growing soft power. However, it is important to note that popular culture is not something under the direct control of the government, and it may or may not align with the government’s policy goals at a given time. Moreover, the global appeal of popular culture is not static; it may increase and decrease over time. As Korean cultural values are absorbed by foreign audiences, what was once novel and fascinating may begin to seem ordinary. Moreover, geopolitical changes have an influence: regional problems with China have encouraged Korea’s entertainment industry to reduce its dependency on China. As a result, the Korean entertainment industry has pushed harder to enter global markets in different regions, including the Americas and Europe. Its cultural diplomacy establishes strong ties through people-to-people connections in Asia and beyond, and enables the country to take a leading role in norm promotion and regional cooperation as a legitimizer and/or supporter of the LIO. Sustaining South Korea’s cultural appeal and continued growth in cultural exports depends on the country’s ability to develop new content to reduce its reliance on the K-pop sector. Beyond this, there are other challenges that Korean society might face in maintaining the country’s cultural appeal, such as the country’s deepening political polarization in the wake of the 2024 martial law declaration, and its falling birthrate and rapidly aging population.

Regional instabilities, domestic problems, and a declining commitment to political ideals have overshadowed Turkey’s cultural outreach and undermined its relations with its neighbours and Western allies. The failed Kurdish peace process, deepening domestic polarization, and military adventurism have contributed to Turkey’s declining soft power. In recent years, Turkish policymaking elites have adopted a preference for multipolarity, challenging Turkey’s previous role as an international stabilizer and supporter of liberal hegemonic projects. At the same time, while democratic backsliding has negatively affected Turkey’s ability to project soft power to Western audiences, its global engagement in developing countries demonstrates that it still retains soft power appeal among audiences in the global South. Thus, soft power still represents a feature of the AKP’s foreign policy— particularly in the use of Turkish TV series to strengthen the country’s bond with Muslim countries and many other non-Western states in the global South. However, Turkey’s democratic problems and authoritarian leadership style are likely to hinder the wider projection of Turkish soft power. Turkey’s strategic autonomy and independent polices also clash with US foreign policy priorities. As the US and its allies have failed to recruit more states from the developing world against Russia and China, the West needs influential secondary states’ support more than ever. The US needs supporters of the system like South Korea, but also countries like Turkey, whose soft power appeal continues to grow in the developing world despite the ongoing decline of democracy in the country. Focusing only on alliances with like-minded countries and on support for democratic governance is likely to distract the US from competition with China and Russia amid the global trend of democratic backsliding. The global South perceives hypocrisy in America’s unconditional support for Israel despite the worsening humanitarian conditions in Gaza and the death toll exceeding 40,000 Palestinian civilians, and views this support as discrediting the US’s professed commitment to democratic ideals and human rights.

The comparative analysis of Turkish and South Korean soft power strategies provides an understanding of the capacities of cultural diplomacy activism, changing foreign policy styles, and varying levels of commitment to democratic values. While South Korea’s soft power resources and pro-Western stance—though subject to change with the possibility of the DPK’s rise to power following Yoon’s impeachment—have elevated the country’s international standing as a supporter of the LIO, Turkey’s security-oriented policies, hard power practices, and declining commitment to liberal values have gradually distanced it from the Western camp. Despite their differences, however, both countries are valuable assets for the US due to their soft power appeal, not only in developed regions, but also in developing countries where many states choose to sit on fences on issues such as Russia’s invasion of Ukraine, and refuse to choose a side in the ongoing US–Russia and US–China rivalries. With the return of Trump, a significant shift in US foreign policy is to be expected, as the second Trump administration appears to be prioritizing American interests over upholding the LIO. However, advancing American interests will still require the support of allies, particularly secondary states, to compete with China and Russia, as the 2020s are shaping up to be a decisive decade in the emerging great-power competition and in determining the future of the international order.

A portion of this paper was written during the author’s visiting fellowship at Seoul National University Asia Center (SNUAC). The author’s research visit at the SNUAC was supported by the Scientific and Technological Research Council of Türkiye, 2219-International Postdoctoral Research Fellowship Programme.